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Abstract 
 
This study aims to determine the factors that affect the CEO compensation. Variables used in 
this study include corporate social responsibility, return on assets, CEO ownership, independent 
board, tobin's q, firm size, and leverage. The approach used in this research is quantitative 
approach. The samples in this study are companies in the mining sector listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (BEI) in the period of 2012-2016. Based on the results of the test, the results 
obtained that the variables of corporate social responsibility, return on assets, CEO ownership, 
board independent, firm size, and leverage have a significant influence on CEO compensation 
Return on assets variables have a significant positive impact on CEO compensation. CEO 
ownership variables have a significant negative impact on CEO compensation. Variable board 
independent, firm size, and leverage have a significant positive impact on CEO compensation. 
 
Keywords: CEO Compensation, CEO Ownership, Corporate Social Responsibility. 
 
Abstrak 
 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi CEO 
compensation. Variabel yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini antara lain corporate social 
responsibility, return on asset, CEO ownership, board independent, tobin’s q, firm size, dan 
leverage. Pendekatan yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah pendekatan kuantitatif. 
Sampel dalam penelitian ini adalah perusahaan-perusahaan pada sektor pertambangan yang 
terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) pada periode tahun 2012-2016. Berdasarkan hasil 
pengujian, diperoleh  hasil bahwa variabel corporate social responsibility memberikan 
pengaruh  positif signifikan. Variabel return on asset  berpengaruh positif signifikan terhadap 
kompensasi CEO. Variabel CEO ownership berpengaruh negatif signifikan terhadap 
kompensasi CEO. Variabel board independent, firm size, dan leverage memberikan pengaruh 
positif signifikan terhadap CEO compensation. 
 
Keywords: CEO Compensation, CEO Ownership, Corporate Social Responsibility. 
JEL Classsification Code: G32 
 
1. Research Background  
In current economic conditions, companies and communities must be able to create 
beneficial relationships. In fact, there are many cases have shown that the existence of 
companies have negative impact on the community around the company. The company's ability 
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to adapt to the surrounding community is one of the prerequisites for the existence of the 
company. This condition causes a business to have a good performance. Business performance 
is always influenced by internal and external factors of the company. In order to be able to 
produce good performance, the involvement of business entities in conflict and problems in 
business must be minimized by creating a good relationship between the company and the 
community in the form of social responsibility or also called Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR). To create social responsibility, the executive management must intervene. These 
executives are given the responsibility to make decisions related to the company that support 
the interests of shareholders. The performance appraisal component is one of the determinants 
of compensation policy that aims to direct executives’ behavior to be diligent in working, 
productive in improving performance and increasing company value. If the performance target 
achieved is higher, then the compensation obtained is also greater. Compensation is also used 
as a tool to maintain a skilled workforce in managing the company (Anthony and Govindarajan 
2011). If an executive becomes more capable, it is not impossible that the compensation 
package received will be even higher. This is related to the skills needed by the executive to 
take policies that lead to the achievement of company goals more efficiently. 
CEO compensation is an important part of corporate governance. Conflicts within the 
company are often caused by compensation motives. Relationships that are well-established 
between the principal and agent are very vulnerable to problems when talking about the amount 
of compensation given. Compensation can be a tool to direct managers' attention to social 
goals. Corporate social goals are achieved by implementing Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR). Kane in Mahoney & Thorne (2006) stated that when companies are more socially 
responsible and prioritize long-term goals, those companies will enjoy long-term benefits. This 
is because the implementation of CSR will have a positive impact on consumer buying interest, 
so that it will increase sales which will affect the increasing of the company's performance. 
Increasing company performance leads to the achievement of performance targets so that the 
compensation obtained will increase. Companies that carry out social responsibility (CSR) and 
their environment get more value from external parties.  
Classical Agency Theory explains that compensation is another form of agency 
problem. According to Jian et al. (2015) in his study that discussed CEO compensation and 
corporate social responsibility by using independent variables namely corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), company size (FIRMSIZE), return on assets (ROA), volatility return on 
assets (VOLAROA), return (RETURN ), stock return volatility (VOLARET), dividend (MTB) 
market value of equity, TUNURE, age of CEO (AGE), independent directors on the board 
(BINDEP), common stock owned (BDOWN), institutional shareholders (INSTI). The 
dependent variable used is CEO compensation. The results of the study show that CSR, 
TENURE, BINDEP, BDOWN, INSTI have a significant negative impact on CEO 
compensation. FIRMSIZE, ROA, RETURN, MTB have a significant positive influence on 
CEO compensation. VOLAROA, VOLARET, AGE has no significant positive influence on 
CEO compensation. The results of this study found that corporate social responsibility has a 
significant negative correlation to the CEO Compensation. 
 According to Rekker et al. (2014) in their research used are corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), the log of total assets (LSIZE), Tobin Q is measured as the ratio of asset 
market value to asset book value (TOBQ), leverage (LEV), return on assets (ROA), share 
ownership percentage CEO (CEOOWN), log of the number of directors (LBSIZE), the 
percentage of independent directors on the board (BINDEP). While the dependent variable 
used is CEO compensation. The results of the study show that CSR has a significant negative 
impact on CEO compensation. LSIZE, TOBQ, and BINDEP have a significant positive 
influence on CEO compensation. LBSIZE, LEV, ROA has no significant positive impact on 
CEO compensation while CEOOWN has no significant negative influence on CEO 
compensation. 
  
                                                  Journal of Management and Business, Vol. 16, No. 1(March 2017) 
 
p-1412-3789  www.journalmabis.org 
e-2477-1783   
  12 
 According to Cai et al. (2011) in his study discussed The Impact of Corporate Social 
Responsibility on Executive Compensation. Independent variables used by firm size 
(FIRMSIZE), Tobin Q is measured as the ratio of asset market value to asset book value 
(TOBQ), leverage (LEV), return on assets (ROA), share ownership percentage (CEOOWN), 
Total number of directors on board (BSIZE), and board independence (BINDEP). The 
dependent variable used in this study is CEO compensation. The results of this study indicate 
that FIRMSIZE, TOBQ, LEV, ROA, BINDEP have a significant positive influence on CEO 
compensation. CEOOWN has a significant negative impact on CEO compensation whereas 
BSIZE has no significant negative impact on CEO compensation. 
 Study by Jian et al. (2015) stated that CSR has a significant negative impact on CEO 
compensation. These results showed that when CSR investments deviate from optimal levels, 
CEOs receive lower compensation for excessive investment in CSR. A strong corporate 
governance structure punishes other CEOs reducing CEO compensation if the CEO invests 
more in CSR. Meanwhile, Karen & Robert (2014) stated that CSR has a significant negative 
impact on CEO compensation. The results showed that crisis conditions have an impact on the 
relationship between the amount of compensation and cash compensation with CSR. The crisis 
has a negative and significant moderate impact for cash compensation and the most important 
is that during the non-crisis period, the relationship between CEO compensation and CSR is not 
significant (for each compensation component). 
The research by Jian et al. (2015) stated that size has a significant positive impact on 
CEO compensation. Size indicates the size of the company, the bigger or more complex a 
company, the compensation received by the CEO will also increase. Cai et al. (2011) stated that 
size has a significant positive impact on CEO compensation. The bigger a company, the market 
reputation will also increase and the compensation practices received will also be greater than 
other companies with smaller sizes. 
 Study conducted by Jian et al. (2015) and Cai et al. (2011) stated that return on assets 
has a significant positive correlation to CEO compensation. ROA reflects how much return is 
generated on every rupiah invested in assets (Murhadi 2013). The higher the ROA, the better it 
will be for the company so that if the company's performance increases indirectly it can affect 
the CEO's compensation. Whereas in the research of Rekker et al. (2014) stated that return on 
assets has no significant positive correlation for the long term to CEO compensation. The 
amount of return generated on every rupiah invested in the form of assets does not always 
affect the company's performance in the long run. 
 In the research by Rekker et al. (2014)  showed that leverage has no significant 
positive impact on CEO compensation. Leverage here shows the company's long-term debt. 
The compensation received by the CEO has a strong influence on the strength of the CEO itself 
so that leverage is not a variable that significantly correlates with the compensation received by 
the CEO. Meanwhile, according to Cai et al. (2011) showed that leverage has a significant 
positive impact on CEO compensation. Leverage shows that the debt ratio, where if the debt 
ratio of a large company shows that the company cannot manage the company's debt properly 
so that it will affect the compensation received by the CEO. In the research of Rekker et al. 
(2014)  showed that leverage has no significant positive impact on CEO compensation. 
Leverage here shows the company's long-term debt. The compensation received by the CEO 
has a strong influence on the strength of the CEO itself so that leverage is not a variable that 
significantly correlates with the compensation received by the CEO. Meanwhile, according to 
Cai et al. (2011) showed that leverage has a significant positive impact on CEO compensation. 
Leverage shows that the debt ratio, where if the debt ratio of a large company shows that the 
company cannot manage the company's debt properly so that it will affect the compensation 
received by the CEO. 
In the research by Rekker et al. (2014) stated that TOBQ has a significant positive 
influence on CEO compensation. This research shows that the alternative used in assessing the 
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value of a company is to use Tobin's Q. Tobin's Q shows that investment in assets generates 
profits that give a higher value than investment in expenditure, this will stimulate new 
investment. Cai et al. (2011) stated that TOBQ has a significant positive impact on CEO 
compensation. In his research, Tobin's Q is a more rigorous measure of how impactively 
management utilizes economic resources in its power. 
 In the research by Rekker et al. (2014) showed the percentage of share ownership of 
CEO (CEOOWN) has no significant negative influence on CEO compensation. The level of 
CEO ownership of the company's shares has no significant negative relationship to CEO 
compensation. Meanwhile, according to Cai et al. (2011) stated that CEOOWN has a 
significant negative impact on CEO compensation. The level of CEO ownership of the 
company's shares has a significant negative relationship to CEO compensation, meaning that in 
a company whose CEO ownership is still dominant, a CEO is paid less than the CEO in a 
company where public ownership is more dominant. 
 Study by Jian et al. (2015) stated that an independent board of directors (board 
independence) has a significant negative influence on CEO compensation. The board 
independence is a main part of the company in supervising the company's management carried 
out by the directors and advising the directors in running the company's operations, where it has 
a negative influence on CEO compensation. Meanwhile, according to Rekker et al. (2014) and 
Cai et al. (2011) stated that the board independence has a significant positive influence on CEO 
compensation. The board independence has an important role as a bridge between the interests 
of management and the interests of shareholders. The board independence carries out a 
monitoring function that is independent to the company's performance and aims to maximize 
returns for shareholders; if the shareholders are satisfied then the company's performance is 
better which eventually affecting the compensation received by the CEO. 
      The research by Rekker et al. (2014) stated that Tobin's Q has a significant positive 
impact on CEO compensation. Tobin's Q is used as a performance measurement tool that 
carries an important role related to financial decisions that can affect CEO compensation. Cai et 
al. (2011) stated that Tobin's Q has a significant positive impact on CEO compensation. If the 
Tobin’s Q value of the company is greater than it reflects the better performance of the 
company where the better the company's performance will affect the compensation received by 
the CEO. 
 In this study, the objects used are all mining companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (BEI) to be able to test the independent variables used as a reference with the 
dependent variables that have been determined. 
       This study certainly has advantages and differences when compared with other or 
previous studies considering research on the influence of corporate social responsibility on 
CEO compensation is rarely examined in Indonesia. This study uses and combines  journals by 
Jian et al. (2015) and Cai et al. (2011) by using the independent variables return on assets 
(ROA), debt ratio (LEV), CEO (CEOOWN) share ownership, independent board of directors 
(BINDEP), company size (FIRMSIZE), Tobin's Q (TOBQ), and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and the dependent variable is CEO compensation. 
 
2. Research Method 
The population in this study are all mining sector companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (IDX) for the period of 2012-2016 with the following criteria: (1) business 
entities listed on the IDX for five consecutive years, (2) business entities publish audited 
financial statements annually during the period of 2012 to 2016, (3) data was available for all 
variables needed during the period of 2012 to 2016. While the characteristics of the population 
are: (1) Elements: Consisting of all elements in the company's financial statements published 
on the IDX  period of 2012-2016, (2) Sampling Unit: The sampling unit drawn from the 
population element and the basis for this research is total assets, return on assets, CEO 
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ownership, independent board, market value, corporate social responsibility, firm size and 
leverage, (3) Scope: The scope of this research is all companies whose financial statements are 
on the IDX period of 2012-2016, (4) Time: The period used to assess the company's financial 
performance is five years, namely 2012-2016. This study uses a time sample by entering data 
for all mining sector companies listed on the IDX for the period of 2012-2016. 
This study uses multiple linear regression data processing methods to determine the 
impact of independent variables on the dependent variable. The variables used in this study are 
dependent and independent variables. The dependent variable in this study is CEO 
Compensation, while the independent variables are return on assets, CEO ownership, 
independent board, Tobin's Q, firm size, leverage and corporate social responsibility. 
 
CEO Compensationit= ∝ + 𝛽1  .  𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡  +   𝛽2  .  𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽3 . 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡  
+ 𝛽4   .  𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡  +   𝛽5  .  𝑇𝑂𝐵𝑄𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽6  .  𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽7  .  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  +𝑒………..............(1) 
 
Note: 
CEO Compensationit   = Logarithm of the sum of one and the number of CEO compensation 
levels consisting of bonuses, given stock options, prohibited shares 
provided, long-term incentive payments and other compensation in the 
fiscal year. 
CSRit  = the amount of CSR funds issued by the company divided by total assets. 
FIRM SIZEit  = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
ROAit  = Operating income divided by total assets. 
BINDEPit  = Percentage of independent commissioners on the board of directors and 
commissioners. 
TOBQit  = Ratio of market price to book value of assets. 
CEOOWNit  = the composition of CEO share ownership. 
LEVit = total liabilities divided by total assets.  
 
 Independent Variables: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Variable Relationship Chart 
 
 
3. Result and Discussion 
3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
CSR 
Return on asset 
 
CEO Ownership 
 
Firm Size 
Leverage 
Control Variables: 
CEO 
compensation 
 
Board 
Independent 
H1 (+) 
H2 (+) 
H3 (-) 
H4 (+) 
H5 (+) 
H6 (+) 
H7 (+) 
Tobin’s Q 
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Table 1 shows the statistics of each research variables namely corporate social 
responsibility, return on assets, CEO ownership, independent board, Tobin's q, firmsize, and 
leverage as independent variables and CEO compensation as the dependent variable. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistic (IDX) 
 CEO_COMP CSR ROA CEO_OWN BOARD_IND TOBQ SIZE LEV 
 Mean 9.294 0.0023 0.004 0.015 0.390 1.473 29.094 0.498 
 Median 9.369 0.0007 0.015 0.000 0.333 1.064 29.142 0.468 
 Maximum 10.409 0.079 0.300 0.350 0.750 10.598 32.106 1.897 
 Minimum 7.916 0.000 -0.721 0.000 0.167 0.204 22.757 0.007 
 Std. Dev. 0.551 0.006 0.119 0.052 0.102 1.372 1.809 0.288 
 Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
 
Compensation CEO (CEO_COMP) based on Table 1 shows that on 160 observation 
data used has an average value of 9,294 and has a standard deviation of 0,551. CSR has an 
average value of 0.0023 with a standard deviation of 0.006. Return on assets based on Table 1 
has an average value of 0.004 and has a standard deviation of 0.119. CEO ownership in Table 1 
shows that it has an average value of 0.015 and has a standard deviation of 0.052. The 
Independent Board in Table 1 has an average value of 0.390 with a standard deviation of 0.102. 
Tobin's q in Table 1 has an average value of 1.473 with a standard deviation value of 1.372. 
Firmsize in Table 1 has an average value of 29,094 with a standard deviation value of 1,809. 
Leverage in Table 1 has an average value of 0.498 with a standard deviation value of 0.288. 
 
3.2. Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
 Multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to examine the impact of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), return on assets (ROA), CEO ownership (CEOOWN), board 
independent (BINDEP), Tobin's q (TOBQ), firm size (SIZE), and leverage (LEV) to CEO 
compensation (CEO_COMP) in mining sector companies. The following is a table that shows 
the results of multiple linear regression analysis: 
 
Table 2. Regression Test Results (CEO_COMP IDX) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob 
C 7.884567 0.075139 14.69350  
CSR 1.043118* 0.001961 1.730443 0,0861 
ROA 0.120577*** 0.006976 4.145102 0,0001 
CEO_OWN  -1.465662* 0.035626  -1.797263 0,0748 
BOARD_IND  0.194173** 0.015724  2.146905 0,0338 
TOBQ 0.003107 0.005138 0.738883 0,4614 
SIZE  0.044877*** 0.000297  2.625348 0,0098 
LEV  0.087287** 0.002677  2.347252 0,0205 
R-Squared 0.985732 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.981251 
F-statistic 219.9875 
Prob (F-Statistic) 0.000000 
Note  *   : significant at 10% 
            **   : significant at 5% 
           *** : significant at 1% 
 
 
CEO_COMP
 
= 7,884567 + 1,043118.CSR + 0,120577.ROA –1,465662.CEO_OWN + 
0,194173.BOARD_IND + 0,003107.TOBQ + 0,044877.SIZE + 0,087287.LEV 
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This equation has a constant value of 7.884567. This means that when the independent variable 
is 0, the CEO compensation value will increase by 7.884567. 
Corporate social responsibility variables have a regression coefficient of 1.043118. This 
value indicates that there is a positive influence between changes in corporate social 
responsibility variables and CEO compensation changes. This means that if there is an increase 
or decrease of 1 unit of corporate social responsibility variables, the CEO compensation 
variable will move in the same direction of 1.043118 assuming other variables remain the 
same. 
Return on assets variable has a regression coefficient of 0.120577. This value indicates 
that there is a positive influence between changes in the variable return on assets and changes 
in CEO compensation. This means that if there is an increase or decrease of 1 variable unit of 
return on assets, then the CEO compensation variable will move in the direction of 0.120577 
assuming other variables remain the same. 
The CEO ownership variable has a regression coefficient value of -1.465662. This value 
indicates that there is a negative influence between changes in CEO ownership variables and 
CEO compensation changes. This means that if there is an increase or decrease of 1 unit of 
CEO ownership variable, then the CEO compensation variable will move opposite at 1,465662 
assuming other variables remain the same. 
Independent board variables have a coefficient value of 0.194173. This value indicates 
that there is a positive influence between independent board variable changes and CEO 
compensation changes. This means that if there is an increase or decrease of 1 independent 
variable board unit, then the CEO compensation variable will move in the direction of 
0.194173 assuming other variables remain the same. 
The Tobin’s q variable has a regression coefficient of 0.003107. This value indicates 
that there is a positive influence between changes in the variable Tobin's q and changes in CEO 
compensation. This means that if there is an increase or decrease of 1 tobin variable's q unit, the 
CEO compensation variable will move in the direction of 0.003107 assuming other variables 
remain the same. 
Variable Size has a coefficient value of 0.044877. This value indicates that there is a 
positive influence between changes in variable size and changes in CEO compensation. This 
means that if there is an increase or decrease of 1 unit of variable Size, then the CEO 
compensation variable will move in the same direction as 0.044877 assuming other variables 
remain the same. 
The leverage variable has a coefficient value of 0.087287. This value indicates that 
there is a positive influence between changes in leverage variables and CEO compensation 
changes. This means that if there is an increase or decrease of 1 unit of the leverage variable, 
then the CEO compensation variable will move in the same direction as 0.087287 assuming 
other variables remain the same. 
The F test is useful to find out whether the independent variables together have a 
significant impact on the dependent variable. To find out about this, F test can be done on 
multiple linear regression models with Fixed Impact Model. The results of this F test can be 
seen from the F-statistical probability. If the F-statistical probability value gets smaller, the 
stronger the independent variable will be on the dependent variable 
Table 2 showed that the probability of F-statistics is below 1% that is equal to 0%. Thus 
it can be stated that the variables of corporate social responsibility, return on assets, CEO 
ownership, independent board, Tobin's q, size, and leverage together have a significant impact 
on CEO compensation at level 1%. 
Table 2 shows that the coefficient of corporate social responsibility variables is 
1.043118 and the significance level is 0.0861. This means that corporate social responsibility 
variables have a significant positive relationship to CEO compensation. This is supported by 
research by Rekker et al. (2014) stating that corporate social responsibility has a significant 
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positive influence on CEO compensation. This is because companies that carry out CSR 
activities regularly are able to build a good reputation and consumers increasingly know the 
company that is always doing activities that are beneficial to the community, so as to create 
customer loyalty and increase the demand for company products. With the increase in sales, the 
company's profit also increases and causes more and more investors who are interested in 
investing their funds in the company. This resulted in the company's stock price also increasing. 
Some companies with the highest CSR scores show an increase in the companies’ stock price. 
The implementation of CSR will increase the company's value seen from the stock price and 
company profit (earnings) as a result of investors who invest in the company. Rekker et al. 
(2014) stated that with good CSR practices, it is expected that the value of the company will be 
properly assessed by investors. This indicates an increase in company performance and 
compensation given to the CEO, as a form of appreciation of the company for the CEO's 
performance in improving the company's performance (Rekker et al. 2014). 
Table 2 showed that the coefficient of the return on assets variable is 0.120577 and the 
significance level is 0.0001. This means that the variable return on assets has a significant 
positive relationship with CEO compensation. This is supported by the study of Jian et al. 
(2015), Cai et al. (2011), Jaiswall & Bhattacharyya (2016), Lazarides et al. (2008), and Iqbal 
and Shehzad (2010) stated that return on assets has a significant positive relationship on CEO 
compensation. Return on Asset reflects how much return is generated on every rupiah invested 
in assets. The higher the ROA, the better it will be for the company because it improves the 
company's performance (Murhadi 2013). Corporate executives have an obligation to increase 
ROA because this will provide an assessment of the performance of a company. Therefore, 
executive compensation is very much based on the rate of return on assets (Iqbal and Shehzad, 
2010). When the ROA value gets higher, it reflects the company's better performance and 
causes the increasing in the amount of compensation given. 
Table 2 showed that the coefficient of CEO ownership variable is -1.465662 and the 
significance level is 0.0748. This means that CEO ownership variables have a significant 
negative relationship on CEO compensation. This is supported by research by Cai et al. (2011), 
Raithatha & Komera (2014), and Chen et al. (2012) who found a significant negative 
relationship between CEO ownership and CEO compensation. This is because the conflict of 
interest between managers and owners becomes greater when managerial ownership of the 
company becomes smaller. In this case the manager will try to maximize his interests compared 
to the interests of the company. Conversely, the greater the manager's ownership in the 
company, the more productive the manager's actions are in maximizing the value of the 
company, so that the contract and supervision costs will be low. 
Table 2 showed that the independent board variable coefficient is 0.194173 and the 
significance level is 0.0338. This means that the independent board variable has a significant 
positive relationship on CEO compensation. This is supported by the research of Rekker et al. 
(2014), Cai et al. (2011), and Ayadi and Boujèlbène (2013) who found significant and 
significant relationships between independent boards and CEO compensation. This is because 
the existence of independent commissioners in the company can help to monitor managers 
because they are more neutral and do not have personal interests so that they can reduce agency 
costs. In addition, independent commissioners have the responsibility to proactively encourage 
the commissioners to carry out their duties as supervisors and advisors to the board of directors 
to ensure that the company has a business strategy so that the performance produced by the 
company will increase. With the increasing performance of the company, the company will 
appreciate the performance of the CEO by providing rewards in the form of greater 
compensation. Ayadi and Boujèlbène (2013) stated that the existence of independent 
commissioners in the company's board of directors can influence the company in determining 
the amount of compensation for the company's executives. 
Table 2 showed that the coefficient of Tobin's q variable q is 0.003107 and the 
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significance level is 0.4614. This means that Tobin’s q variable has a positive and insignificant 
relationship on CEO compensation. This is supported by the research of Darmadi (2011), and 
Lazarides et al. (2008) who found a positive and insignificant relationship between Tobin's q 
and CEO's compensation. According to Darmadi (2011) and Lazariders et al. (2008), this 
shows that there is no relationship between stock premiums and the level of compensation 
received by the CEO. This is because Tobin's q describes market conditions as a measure of 
company value, which means that good market conditions will potentially increase stock prices 
rather than increase compensation received by the CEO. 
Table 2 showed that the coefficient of the size variable is 0.075902 and the significance 
level is 0.0098. This means that the size variable has a significant positive relationship on CEO 
compensation. This is supported by the research of Jian et al. (2015), Cai et al. (2011), and 
Sigler (2011), Gill (2014), Haid and Yurtoglu (2006) who found a significant positive 
relationship between size and CEO compensation. According to Sigler (2011), Gill et al. 
(2014), Haid and Yurtoglu (2006), it was revealed that relatively large companies will also 
have greater ability to make more payments to the company's CEOs. This is because there is a 
relationship that is directly proportional between the responsibilities of the CEO as the 
company leader and the size of the company itself. The greater the size of a company, the 
greater the responsibility that must be borne by the CEO as the leader of that company. In 
addition, a larger company size certainly has a high complexity as well so that it will affect the 
reward in the form of compensation received by the CEO. The greater the size of a company, 
the reputation of the company will also increase and the compensation received by the CEO 
must also be greater compared to other companies whose size is small. 
Table 2 showed that the coefficient of the leverage variable is 0.087287 and the 
significance level is 0.0205. This means that leverage variables have a significant positive 
relationship on CEO compensation. This is supported by research by Cai et al. (2011) who 
found a positive and significant relationship between leverage and CEO compensation. 
According to Myers (1977) in Dawar (2014) stated "Consequently, use of leverage in capital 
structure can reduce agency costs by regulating the choice of investment. Thus increasing 
leverage can have agency costs and have a positive impact on profitability and consequently 
firm performance”. Companies that have high leverage ratios lead to supervision of high 
corporate activities carried out by debt holder. Therefore, the supervision provided will force 
managers to perform better. Companies that can manage their corporate debt properly will also 
increase the company's performance so this will also affect the compensation received by the 
CEO. 
The function of R2 and adjusted-R2 values is to explain how much the dependent 
variable can be explained by the independent variable. R2 has a weakness, that is the value will 
be higher when the number of independent variables increases without paying attention 
whether the new independent variable is significant or not. To prevent this, the adjusted-R2 
value is used, whose value will increase when the independent variable added has a significant 
impact on the dependent variable. Table 4.6, R2 and adjusted-R2 values showed high results 
which are 0.985732 and 0.981251. Thus it can be concluded that the CEO compensation 
dependent variable can be explained well by the independent variables of corporate social 
responsibility, return on assets, CEO ownership, independent board, Tobin's q, size, and 
leverage. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
Based on results of the analysis of the sample companies from 2012 to 2016 on this 
study, it can be concluded as follows: corporate social responsibility (CSR), Return on assets 
(ROA), CEO ownership (CEO_OWN), independent board (BINDEP), size companies (SIZE), 
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and leverage (LEV) have significant impacts on CEO compensation. Based on the research 
used, there are several suggestions that researchers can provide to develop further research, 
including: (1) For further research, it is expected to increase the number of observations by 
examining other sectors listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) and the Stock Exchange 
in ASEAN countries. Thus, the samples used can represent all characteristics in the population 
and can reflect the overall capital market reaction. (2) This research can be used as a reference 
and consideration for investors to consider factors related to CEO compensation such as CSR, 
ROA, CEO ownership, independent board, Tobin's q, size and leverage. In addition, this 
research can also be used as a consideration for investors who want to invest in shares of 
mining sector companies in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
References 
Anthony NR, Govindarajan V. 2011. Management Control System - Sistem Pengendalian 
Manajemen. Jakarta: Salemba Empat.  
Ayadi N, Boujèlbène Y. 2013. The Influence of the Board of Directors on the Executive 
  
                                                  Journal of Management and Business, Vol. 16, No. 1(March 2017) 
 
p-1412-3789  www.journalmabis.org 
e-2477-1783   
  20 
Compensation in the Banking Industry. Global Business and Management Research: 
An International Journal. 5(2): 83-90.  
Cai Y, Jo H, Pan C. 2011. Vice or virtue? The impact of corporate social responsibility on 
executive compensation, Jurnal Business Ethics. 104(2): 159–173. 
Chen D, Shen Y, Xin F, Zhang T. 2012.  Overemployment, executive pay-for-performance 
sensitivity and economic consequences: evidence from China. China J. Account. 
Res. 5:1-26 
Dawar V. 2014. Agency theory, capital structure and firm performance: some Indian 
evidence. Managerial Finance. 40(12): 1.190-1.206. 
Darmadi S. 2011. Board compensation, corporate governance, and firm performance in 
Indonesia. Proceedings 14th National Symposium of Accounting. Banda Aceh: 
Universitas Syiah Kuala. 
Gill S. 2014. Rewards for failure: An explanation for anomalous executive remuneration. 
Journal of Indian Business Research. 6(2): 90-127 
Haid A, Yurtoglu BB. 2006. Ownership Structure and Executive Compensation in Germany. 
SSRN Working Paper series. 
Iqbal J,Shehzad S. 2010. Relationship of Cost of Governance and Firm's Profitability in 
Pakistan. SSRN Working Paper series. 
Jaiswall SSK, Bhattacharyya AK. 2016. Corporate governance and CEO compensation in 
Indian firms. Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics. 12(2): 159-175. 
Jian M, Lee KW. 2015. CEO compensation and corporate social responsibility. Journal of 
Multinational Financial Management. 29(C): 46-65. 
Lazarides T, Drimpetas E, Dimitrios K. 2008. Executive board member’s remuneration: A 
longitudinal study. Corporate Ownership & Control. 6: 94-103. 
Mahoney LM, Thorne L. 2006, An examination of the structure of  executive compensation and 
Corporate Social Responsibility: a Canadian investigation, Journal of Business Ethics. 
69(2): 149-162. 
Murhadi WR. 2013. Analisis Laporan Keuangan: Proyeksi dan Valuasi Saham. Jakarta: 
Salemba Empat.  
Raithatha M, Komera S. 2014. Executive compensation and firm performance: Evidence from 
Indian firms. IIMB Management Review. 28(3): 160-169 
Rekker SAC, Benson KL, Faff RW. 2014. Corporate social responsibility and CEO 
compensation revisited: Do disaggregation, market stress, and gender matter?. Journal 
of Economics and Business. 72: 84–103 
Sigler J. 2011. CEO Compensation and Company Performance. Business and Economics 
Journal. 11: 1-8. 
 
 
